New York Dog Bite Laws Explained (Mixed Statute)
Mixed Statute
New York dog bite law changed in April 2025 — Flanders v. Goodfellow restored ordinary negligence claims after 19 years in which New York was the only state that barred them.
How New York Dog Bite Law Works
If a dog bit you in New York, the most important thing to know is that the law changed recently and substantially. On April 17, 2025 the Court of Appeals decided Flanders v. Goodfellow, overruling a 2006 case that had made New York the only state in the country where a dog bite victim could not bring an ordinary negligence claim. That door is now open.
What New York's statute provides is narrower than people expect. Agriculture & Markets Law § 123 imposes strict liability for medical costs only. Pain and suffering, lost wages and everything else that usually makes up the bulk of a claim's value fall outside it, and require either proof the owner knew the dog was dangerous or — since Flanders — proof the owner was simply careless.
The practical consequence deserves stating directly. If you were bitten in New York before April 2025 and were told you had no case because the dog had never bitten anyone before, that advice reflected a rule that no longer exists. New York's three-year deadline means a meaningful number of those claims are still within time and worth a second look.
Where a New York attorney adds value is in deciding which theories to plead and assembling evidence for each. Vicious propensity under Collier v. Zambito does not require proving the owner did anything wrong, only that they knew what the dog was capable of — and the owner's own precautions, a muzzle, a chain, a warning sign, are often the best proof of that. Negligence is now available alongside it, reaching cases where the dog had no history but the owner lost control of it.
Fees are contingency across the board, and New York regulates the structure: court rules set a sliding scale in some case types and require a written retainer. Nothing is owed upfront, and typically nothing is owed at all if there is no recovery.
Timelines vary with how contested liability is. A claim with a documented dangerous dog determination and clear medical costs can resolve in months. A case where propensity is disputed, or where a municipal defendant is involved, routinely runs past a year. Settling before treatment reaches maximum medical improvement remains the most common regret.
Not every bite needs representation. What tends to change it here: any injury beyond medical costs alone, since that is where New York's layered structure starts to matter; a child victim; a denied claim; any involvement of a city agency or housing authority, because of the 90-day notice deadline; and any case where you were told before April 2025 that no claim existed.
The evidence that decides a New York claim is consistent: photographs of the wound over time, the animal bite report to the Health Department, any § 121 dangerous dog proceeding record, the owner's name and insurance details, witness contacts, and the full medical file. Evidence of how the dog was normally kept — muzzled, chained, behind a sign — is worth pursuing specifically, because it goes to propensity.
| Liability rule | Mixed statute. Strict liability covers medical and veterinary costs only; since Flanders v. Goodfellow (April 2025), everything else can be pursued under strict liability for vicious propensity OR ordinary negligence. |
|---|---|
| Governing statute | Dangerous dogs; liability of ownerN.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 123 |
| Deadline to file | 3 years from the date of the biteN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) |
| If the victim is a child | C.P.L.R. § 208 tolls the period during infancy, so the three years generally begins when the child turns 18. The 90-day municipal notice requirement is treated differently and should not be assumed to be tolled. |
| Shared fault | Pure comparative negligenceN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 |
| Cap on pain & suffering | None. New York does not cap non-economic damages in personal injury claims. |
| Does breed matter? | N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 107(5) prohibits municipalities from enacting breed-specific legislation. Breed plays no role in the § 123 analysis. |
| Dangerous dog law | N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 121 (dangerous dog proceedings) |
Statute text verified against the official source linked above. General information, not legal advice.
New York Dog Bite Law Changed Substantially in April 2025
On April 17, 2025 the Court of Appeals decided Flanders v. Goodfellow, overruling Bard v. Jahnke to the extent it barred negligence claims for injuries caused by domestic animals. For 19 years New York was the only state in the country where a dog bite victim could not sue in ordinary negligence.
Between 2006 and April 2025, New York occupied a genuinely singular position. Under Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006), an owner of a domestic animal could be held liable only on a strict liability theory, and only where the plaintiff proved the owner knew or should have known of the animal's vicious propensities. There was no negligence cause of action at all. A victim bitten by a dog with a clean history, whose owner had been careless in some obvious way, simply had no route to damages beyond medical costs.
Flanders v. Goodfellow, 2025 NY Slip Op 02261, ended that. The Court of Appeals concluded the Bard rule was inconsistent with ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable in practice, and overruled it to the extent it barred negligence liability. A plaintiff may now plead strict liability for vicious propensity, ordinary negligence, or both.
The practical consequence is worth stating plainly: if you were bitten in New York before April 2025 and were told you had no claim because the dog had never bitten anyone before, that advice reflected a rule that no longer exists. New York's three-year limitations period means a number of those claims are still within time.
The Statute Covers Medical Costs Only
Agriculture & Markets Law § 123 makes the owner of a dangerous dog strictly liable for medical costs — and nothing more. Pain and suffering, lost wages and loss of consortium fall outside it entirely and require a separate legal theory.
The statutory language is narrow by design: "The owner or lawful custodian of a dangerous dog shall be strictly liable for medical costs resulting from injury caused by such dog to a person, companion animal, farm animal or domestic animal." Medical and veterinary costs are recoverable without proving anything about the owner’s knowledge. Everything else is not.
This is why New York sits in the mixed-statute category rather than with the strict liability states. A New York claim is typically built in layers: § 123 for the medical costs, and then either a vicious-propensity theory or — since Flanders — an ordinary negligence theory to reach the damages that usually make up most of a claim's value.
What Counts as a "Vicious Propensity"
Under Collier v. Zambito, 6 N.Y.3d 444 (2006), a vicious propensity is a tendency to act in a way that might endanger someone. It need not be a prior bite — courts have accepted evidence that a dog was routinely muzzled, chained, or kept behind warning signs.
The phrase sounds more demanding than the case law actually requires. New York courts have found vicious propensities established by evidence that a dog lunged at passers-by, growled at visitors, was habitually restrained in a way suggesting the owner considered it a risk, or was kept behind a 'Beware of Dog' sign. The owner's own precautions are frequently the best evidence that they knew.
Establishing propensity remains the route to full damages under strict liability, and it carries an advantage over the negligence route: it does not require showing the owner behaved unreasonably, only that they knew what the dog was capable of and it did that thing. Since Flanders the two theories can be pleaded together, which is now standard practice.
When the Statute Does Not Apply at All
Agriculture & Markets Law § 121(6) removes the dangerous dog provisions where the dog was protecting against a trespasser or someone committing a crime on the owner’s property, where the person was tormenting or abusing the dog, or where a police work dog was acting in the course of its duties.
The exceptions are narrower than the equivalents in Colorado or Florida — there is no posted-sign defence in New York, for instance. What § 121(6) does exclude is a dog reacting to a trespasser or to someone committing a criminal offence against a person on the owner's property, a dog responding to being tormented, abused or assaulted, and a police work dog performing its duties.
Note what the list does not contain. Lawful visitors, delivery workers and postal carriers are not excluded, and neither is a bite occurring in a public place. Where an exception does not apply, the analysis proceeds through § 123, vicious propensity, and negligence in the ordinary way.
The Dangerous Dog Proceeding Under § 121
Anyone may file a complaint that leads a municipal judge or justice to determine whether a dog is dangerous. The proceeding is separate from a civil claim, requires no attorney, and produces findings that can matter considerably in the civil case.
Section 121 allows any person to complain to a dog control officer or police officer, who may then bring a proceeding before a municipal judge or justice. If the dog is found dangerous the court may order measures ranging from confinement, leashing and muzzling through to microchipping, neutering and, in the most serious cases, humane euthanasia.
For a bite victim the proceeding matters in two ways. A dangerous dog finding is what triggers § 123's strict liability for medical costs. And the record it creates — sworn testimony about the dog's history, the owner's account, prior incidents — is often the clearest documentary evidence of vicious propensity available for the civil case.
Pure Comparative Negligence in New York
New York applies pure comparative negligence under C.P.L.R. § 1411. Your damages are reduced by your share of fault but never eliminated — a plaintiff found 80% responsible still recovers 20%.
New York is one of roughly a dozen pure comparative jurisdictions, and the difference from its neighbours is stark. In Pennsylvania and Ohio a plaintiff more than half at fault recovers nothing; in New York the same plaintiff recovers a reduced amount. In practice this means a provocation argument in New York trims a claim rather than threatening it.
The rule applies to the negligence and vicious-propensity theories. Section 123's medical-costs obligation is strict liability and operates on its own footing, which is one reason New York claims are frequently pleaded on multiple counts rather than a single theory.
Landlord Liability in New York
A New York landlord can be liable where they knew of a tenant’s dog’s vicious propensities and had the ability to remove the dog or have the tenant remove it. Common areas produce the strongest claims, because that is where the landlord’s control is clearest.
The controlling question is knowledge plus control. A landlord who received written complaints about a tenant's dog, or who witnessed aggressive behaviour directly, and who had the contractual right to require removal of the animal, can be liable when the dog later injures someone. New York City buildings generate a meaningful share of these claims, where dogs are encountered in lobbies, elevators and stairwells rather than fenced yards.
Since Flanders, the negligence route reaches landlords as well. A landlord whose failure to maintain a door, gate or common-area barrier allowed a dog to reach someone can now face an ordinary negligence claim without any need to establish what they knew about that particular animal.
Wrongful Death After a Fatal Attack
A wrongful death action is brought by the personal representative of the estate under EPTL § 5-4.1, generally within two years of death — shorter than the three years that applies to a non-fatal injury claim.
New York's wrongful death statute is more restrictive than most in what it compensates: recovery focuses on the pecuniary loss to the distributees, along with funeral expenses and, through a survival action, the decedent's own conscious pain and suffering before death. Grief and loss of companionship are not compensable as such, which distinguishes New York from many neighbouring states.
The deadline difference deserves attention. A survival action follows the three-year personal injury period, while the wrongful death claim itself runs two years from the date of death. Families frequently assume a single deadline governs both.
Municipal Defendants and the 90-Day Notice Trap
Where a city agency, housing authority or other municipality is involved, General Municipal Law § 50-e requires a notice of claim within 90 days and § 50-i requires suit within one year and 90 days. That is dramatically shorter than the ordinary three-year window.
This is the deadline that ends otherwise viable New York claims. A bite involving a NYCHA property, a city park, a police dog or any municipal agency triggers the notice requirement, and a notice filed late generally requires court permission that is not guaranteed.
The practical difficulty is that the 90-day clock runs whether or not you have worked out who the correct defendant is. If there is any possibility a public entity is involved — the property is city-owned, the dog belonged to an agency, the incident occurred in public housing — that question needs answering within days rather than months.
Breed Cannot Be Regulated in New York
Agriculture & Markets Law § 107(5) prohibits municipalities from enacting breed-specific legislation anywhere in the state. Breed plays no part in the § 123 analysis or in a vicious propensity determination.
The statewide preemption means no New York county, city or village may single out a breed for regulation. A dangerous dog determination under § 121 turns on the individual animal's behaviour, and the civil analysis turns on what the owner knew about that animal.
Insurance is the exception that persists. New York does not bar carriers from underwriting on breed, so a homeowners or renters policy may still exclude particular breeds — which occasionally becomes the reason an owner's cooperation changes once their insurer is notified.
Uninsured Owners and NYC Rental Realities
Most claims are paid from a homeowners or renters policy. In New York City, where a large share of residents rent, renters insurance and building policies are frequently where coverage is actually found.
Renters insurance commonly includes liability coverage for a pet, and it is worth identifying early because tenants often do not realise their policy responds to a dog bite. Where the incident occurred in a building common area, the building's own liability policy may respond in addition to or instead of the owner's.
Where no coverage exists at all, the claim becomes a direct action against personal assets, and its value tracks what the defendant actually has. That assessment is worth making before committing to litigation rather than after.
Delivery Workers, Postal Carriers, and Dog Parks
Delivery and postal workers are lawfully present and fall outside § 121(6)’s exceptions. USPS carriers also have a federal workers’ compensation route through FECA, which runs independently and does not block a civil claim against the owner.
New York City's density makes route workers a disproportionate share of bite victims — deliveries to apartment doors, packages handed over in vestibules, dogs encountered in hallways. None of that is within the trespass or crime exceptions in § 121(6), so the ordinary analysis applies. A USPS carrier has FECA for the employer-side claim; UPS, FedEx and app-based couriers have no federal equivalent and depend entirely on the civil claim.
Dog park incidents do not fundamentally change the analysis either. Liability attaches per dog and per owner, so where two dogs from different households are involved each owner answers for their own animal. Being in an off-leash area does not make you unlawfully present — the recurring dispute is whether you did something the dog reacted to, which since Flanders can also be framed as whether the owner failed to control an animal they should have been watching.
Red means the owner's insurer can use it against you. Green means New York has closed that argument off.
| Defense | Status | How it works in New York |
|---|---|---|
| No vicious propensity known to the owner | Available | Still the central defense for damages beyond medical costs. The owner must have known or should have known of the dog's vicious propensities — the rule from Collier v. Zambito, 6 N.Y.3d 444 (2006). |
| Damages beyond medical costs | Available | Section 123's strict liability is narrow by design: it reaches medical and veterinary costs only. Pain and suffering, lost wages and loss of consortium all require a separate theory. |
| Trespassing | Available | § 121(6) provides that the dangerous dog provisions do not apply where the dog was protecting against a trespasser or a person committing a crime on the owner's property. |
| Provocation / tormenting the dog | Available | § 121(6) also exempts a dog reacting to someone tormenting, abusing or assaulting it — and separately, provocation feeds into C.P.L.R. § 1411 pure comparative fault. |
| Police or military working dog | Available | § 121(6) excludes a police work dog acting in the course of its duties. |
| "No negligence claim exists" (the Bard rule) | Not a defense | No longer available. Flanders v. Goodfellow, 2025 NY Slip Op 02261 (Apr. 17, 2025), overruled Bard v. Jahnke to the extent it barred negligence liability for domestic animals. For 19 years New York was the only state that blocked these claims entirely. |
| Breed of the dog | Not a defense | Agriculture & Markets Law § 107(5) preempts municipal breed-specific legislation statewide. |
Pure comparative negligence. Fault reduces the award proportionally and never bars it — a plaintiff 80% at fault still recovers 20%. New York is one of only a dozen or so pure comparative states, and it is markedly more forgiving than neighbouring Pennsylvania's 51% bar.
Example: on a claim otherwise worth $100,000, being found 30% responsible would typically leave about $70,000 — and even a majority-fault finding would reduce the award rather than eliminate it.
Statute of Limitations in New York
New York allows three years from the date of the bite under C.P.L.R. § 214(5) — longer than most states covered here, and longer than neighbouring Pennsylvania's two. A wrongful death claim is shorter, generally two years from the date of death under EPTL § 5-4.1, while a survival action for the decedent's own damages follows the three-year period. For a minor, C.P.L.R. § 208 tolls the period during infancy, so the three years generally begins at eighteen. The deadline that actually ends New York claims is municipal. Where a city agency, housing authority, transit authority or other public entity is involved, General Municipal Law § 50-e requires a notice of claim within 90 days of the incident, and § 50-i requires suit within one year and 90 days. Late notice requires court permission that is not guaranteed. The difficulty is that the 90-day clock runs whether or not you have identified the correct defendant, so where there is any possibility a public entity is involved — a NYCHA building, a city park, a police dog — that needs resolving within days. One further note specific to the current moment: Flanders v. Goodfellow was decided on April 17, 2025, and because New York's ordinary period is three years, claims arising before that date may still be within time and may now support theories that were unavailable when they arose.
Dog bite law varies more between states than most people expect — the same attack can be a straightforward claim in one state and a difficult one across a state line.
| State | Rule | Statute | Deadline | Shared fault | What stands out |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama dog bite laws | Mixed statute | Ala. Code § 3-6-1 | 2 years | Contributory (any fault bars) | The statute reaches bites on the owner’s property only, and § 3-6-3 cuts the claim to actual expenses where the owner knew nothing about the dog. |
| Alaska dog bite laws | One-bite / negligence | No statute (AS 09.17.010 caps damages) | 2 years | Pure comparative | Non-economic damages capped at $400,000 — or $1,000,000 where the injury is severe permanent disfigurement. |
| Arizona dog bite laws | Strict liability | A.R.S. § 11-1025 | 1 year (statutory) / 2 years (negligence) | Pure comparative | Shortest deadline in the country for the statutory claim; breed cannot be considered by any legal decision-maker. |
| Arkansas dog bite laws | One-bite rule | No civil statute (Ark. Code § 5-62-125 criminal) | 3 years | Modified (50% bar) | Recovery is barred at exactly 50 percent fault, not 51 — and a minor’s window runs three years past majority. |
| California dog bite laws | Strict liability | Civ. Code § 3342 | 2 years | Pure comparative | Minor's claim tolled until age 18; cities cannot ban dogs by breed. |
| Colorado dog bite laws | Mixed statute | C.R.S. § 13-21-124 | 2 years | Modified (50% bar) | Strict liability reaches economic damages only, and only on serious bodily injury. A posted "Beware of Dog" sign is a complete defense. |
| Connecticut dog bite laws | Strict liability | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-357 | 3 years (statutory) / 2 years (negligence) | Modified (51% bar) | Covers any damage a dog does, not just bites. A child under seven is presumed not to have trespassed or teased — the burden shifts to the defendant. |
| Delaware dog bite laws | Strict liability | 16 Del. C. § 3053F | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | Animal control is run statewide by Delaware Animal Services rather than by each city — the only state on this site with a single centralised agency. |
| District of Columbia dog bite laws | Mixed statute | D.C. Code §§ 8-1808, 8-1812 | 3 years | Pure contributory — 1% bars all recovery | Letting a dog run at large is evidence of negligence, and lack of knowledge is no excuse — but any contributory fault at all still defeats the claim. |
| Florida dog bite laws | Strict liability | Fla. Stat. § 767.04 | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | A posted "Bad Dog" sign is a complete defense — except against a child under 6. |
| Georgia dog bite laws | Mixed statute | O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 | 2 years | Modified (50% bar) | A violated local leash ordinance is by itself sufficient proof of vicious propensity. Fault bar sits at 50%, not 51%. |
| Hawaii dog bite laws | Mixed statute | Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-9 | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | The statute removes the scienter requirement but not the need to prove unreasonable conduct — except for animals dangerous by species or nature, where liability is absolute. |
| Idaho dog bite laws | One-bite rule | No civil statute; Idaho Code § 25-2805 (at large) | 2 years | Modified (50% bar) | No strict liability statute. Recovery runs on scienter or negligence, and the fault bar sits at 50%, not 51%. |
| Illinois dog bite laws | Strict liability | 510 ILCS 5/16 | 2 years (1 year vs. a local public entity) | Modified (51% bar) | Covers attacks and attempted attacks with no bite, and "owner" includes anyone who keeps, harbors or has custody of the dog. |
| Indiana dog bite laws | Mixed statute | Ind. Code § 15-20-1-3 | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | Strict liability applies ONLY to people performing a duty imposed by law — mail carriers, meter readers, police. Everyone else gets the one-bite rule. |
| Iowa dog bite laws | Strict liability | Iowa Code § 351.28 | 2 years | Contributory negligence is not a defense | Unusually claimant-friendly: the only statutory defenses are that the victim was committing an unlawful act, or that the dog had rabies. |
| Kansas dog bite laws | One-bite rule | No civil statute — common-law scienter | 2 years | Modified (50% bar) | No dog bite statute, and the fault bar sits at 50%. Local leash ordinances do most of the practical work in establishing negligence. |
| Kentucky dog bite laws | Strict liability | KRS 258.235(4) | 1 year | Pure comparative | The statutory definition of "owner" is broad enough to make a landlord strictly liable — Maupin v. Tankersley (Ky. 2018). Only one year to file. |
| Louisiana dog bite laws | Strict liability | La. Civ. Code art. 2321 | 2 years (1 year before 1 July 2024) | Pure comparative | A civil-law jurisdiction. Prescription doubled from one year to two on 1 July 2024, and the change applies only to injuries arising after that date. |
| Maine dog bite laws | Mixed statute | 7 M.R.S. § 3961 | 6 years | Modified (50% bar) | The longest filing deadline in the country at six years — but strict liability applies only where the dog injured you OFF the owner's premises. |
| Maryland dog bite laws | Strict liability (at large) + presumption | Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1901 | 3 years | Pure contributory (any fault bars) | Breed-neutral since a 2014 legislative reversal of Tracey v. Solesky — but pure contributory negligence stacked on genuine strict liability means any claimant fault, even 1%, can still zero out the claim. |
| Massachusetts dog bite laws | Strict liability (owners and keepers) | MGL c. 140, § 155 | 3 years | Modified (51% bar) | Keeper liability runs against anyone temporarily caring for the dog — boarding kennels, dog walkers, pet sitters — on the same strict liability terms as the owner. Double damages are mandatory (not discretionary) where the owner had prior knowledge. |
| Michigan dog bite laws | Strict liability | MCL 287.351 | 3 years | Modified — bars non-economic damages only | Over 50% fault removes pain and suffering but not medical bills. Provocation is judged objectively, so an accidental act can count. |
| Minnesota dog bite laws | Strict liability | Minn. Stat. § 347.22 | 6 years | Modified (51% bar) | Six-year filing deadline — the longest of any strict liability state on this site. The statute covers any "attack or injury," not only bites, giving full protection to victims knocked down or injured by large dogs without being bitten. |
| Mississippi dog bite laws | One-bite rule | Miss. Code § 15-1-49 (no civil bite statute) | 3 years | Pure comparative | Mississippi is one of very few states with no civil dog bite statute — claims run on common law, requiring proof the owner knew the dog was dangerous before the attack. Mississippi's pure comparative fault rule means even a plaintiff with significant fault recovers a proportional share of damages. |
| Missouri dog bite laws | Strict liability | RSMo § 273.036 | 5 years | Pure comparative | Longest filing window on this list; minor's claim tolled to 21. |
| Montana dog bite laws | Strict liability | Mont. Code § 27-1-715 | 3 years | Modified (51% bar) | Rural insurance market means coverage confirmation is a critical early investigation step — uninsured homeowners rates are higher in Montana than in most urban strict liability states on this site. |
| Nebraska dog bite laws | Strict liability | Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-601 | 4 years | Modified (50% bar) | Four-year filing deadline — one of the longest of any strict liability state. § 54-601 covers "killing, wounding, injuring, worrying, or chasing" — broader than bite-only statutes. |
| Nevada dog bite laws | Negligence (no statute) | No dog bite statute — Glass v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 87 Nev. 321 (1971) | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | The only state here with no dog bite statute at all. Nevada rejected the one-bite rule in 1971 — claims run on ordinary negligence. |
| New Hampshire dog bite laws | Strict liability | RSA 466:19 | 3 years | Modified (51% bar) | Defenses are statutory and narrow — only trespass and deliberate provocation (teasing, tormenting, abusing the dog) are complete defenses. Government entity claims require written notice within 60 days for municipal defendants under RSA 507-B:7. |
| New Jersey dog bite laws | Strict liability | N.J. Stat. § 4:19-16 | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | One of the oldest strict liability statutes in the country (enacted 1933). Harboring liability extends to landlords and employers who knowingly permit a dangerous dog — both faces of the same claim, not alternatives. |
| New Mexico dog bite laws | One-bite rule | NMSA § 37-1-8 (no civil bite statute) | 3 years | Pure comparative | Government entity notice deadline is only 90 days under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMSA § 41-4-16) — the shortest of any state on this site. Claims run on common law with no civil dog bite statute. |
| New York (this page) | Mixed statute | N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 123 | 3 years | Pure comparative | Strict liability covers medical and veterinary costs only. Flanders v. Goodfellow (Apr 2025) restored ordinary negligence claims after 19 years. |
| North Carolina dog bite laws | Mixed statute | N.C.G.S. §§ 67-4.4, 67-12 | 3 years | Pure contributory — 1% bars all recovery | The harshest fault rule in the country. Any contributory negligence at all, however slight, defeats the entire claim. |
| North Dakota dog bite laws | One-bite rule | NDCC 28-01-16(5) (no civil bite statute) | 6 years | Modified (50% bar) | Six-year filing deadline — the longest personal injury window of any state on this site. Modified 50% bar means a plaintiff at exactly 50% fault recovers nothing — stricter than the 51% bar in neighboring Wyoming and New Hampshire. |
| Ohio dog bite laws | Strict liability | Ohio Rev. Code § 955.28(B) | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | Liability reaches the owner, keeper AND harborer. Avery's Law (Mar 2026) added a $100,000 insurance mandate for dangerous dogs. |
| Oklahoma dog bite laws | Strict liability | 4 O.S. § 42.1 | 2 years | Modified (50% bar) | Oklahoma's comparative fault bar falls at 50% — a plaintiff found exactly 50% at fault recovers nothing. This is one percentage point more restrictive than Oregon and New Jersey, where 50% plaintiff fault still allows a half-damages recovery. |
| Oregon dog bite laws | Strict liability | ORS 31.360 | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | Oregon bans breed-specific ordinances statewide under ORS 609.205 — no city or county may restrict or regulate dogs by breed. The liability analysis under ORS 31.360 is fully breed-neutral. |
| Pennsylvania dog bite laws | Mixed statute | 3 P.S. § 459-502 (Dog Law) | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | Strict liability covers medical costs only. Pain and suffering requires proving a "severe injury" or the dog's dangerous propensities. |
| Rhode Island dog bite laws | Strict liability | RIGL § 4-13-16 | 3 years | Pure comparative | Pure comparative fault — recovery is never barred by victim fault, regardless of the percentage. A plaintiff found 90% at fault still recovers 10% of their damages. The most plaintiff-favorable comparative fault system in New England. |
| South Carolina dog bite laws | Strict liability | S.C. Code § 47-3-110 | 3 years | Modified (51% bar) | Keeper liability is express in the statute — liability extends to any person having the dog "in their care or keeping," making dog walkers and boarding facilities directly liable on the same strict liability terms as the registered owner. |
| South Dakota dog bite laws | Strict liability | SDCL § 40-34-1 | 3 years | Slight/gross doctrine | Extends strict liability to "keepers and harborers" — not just the registered owner. Uses unique "slight/gross" comparative negligence rather than standard percentage-based fault. Government entity claims require 180-day written notice under SDCL § 3-21-2. |
| Tennessee dog bite laws | Mixed statute | Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413 | 1 year | Modified (50% bar) | The only state with a "residential exclusion" — strict liability drops away if the bite happened on the owner's own residential or farm property. |
| Texas dog bite laws | One-bite rule | No statute — Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974) | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | No dog bite statute. Recovery requires proving the owner knew of the dog's dangerous propensities, or ordinary negligent handling. |
| Utah dog bite laws | Strict liability | Utah Code § 18-1-1 | 4 years | Modified (50% bar) | Four-year filing deadline — one of the longest of any strict liability state in the country. Utah's statute also has no express lawful-presence language, making the reach of strict liability potentially broader than states with that textual limitation. |
| Vermont dog bite laws | Strict liability | 20 V.S.A. § 3461 | 3 years | Modified (51% bar) | Statute requires victim to have been "peaceably conducting himself or herself" in a lawful location — courts interpret this narrowly to exclude only deliberate provocateurs, not ordinary people in normal activity. Vermont's rural character means farm policies rather than homeowners insurance are common in agricultural-area cases. |
| Virginia dog bite laws | One-bite rule | No civil statute — common-law one-bite rule | 2 years | Pure contributory (any fault bars) | Two compounding disadvantages for victims: no strict liability statute (must prove owner's prior knowledge) plus pure contributory negligence (any fault bars entirely). Strict liability only available after a prior "dangerous dog" designation under § 3.2-6553. |
| Washington dog bite laws | Strict liability | RCW 16.08.040 | 3 years | Pure comparative | Broad strict liability, but provocation is a COMPLETE defense — and a fenced or posted property removes the implied consent that makes you lawfully present. |
| West Virginia dog bite laws | Strict liability | W. Va. Code § 19-20-13 | 2 years | Modified (51% bar) | Harboring theory expressly extends strict liability to landlords who knowingly allowed a dangerous dog on their rental property — a second defendant category not available in most strict liability states. |
| Wisconsin dog bite laws | Strict liability | Wis. Stat. § 174.02 | 3 years | Modified (51% bar) | Double damages are mandatory by statute — not discretionary — whenever the owner was notified or knew the dog had previously injured someone. The entire damages award doubles automatically once prior knowledge is established. |
| Wyoming dog bite laws | One-bite rule | Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105 (no civil bite statute) | 4 years | Modified (51% bar) | Four-year filing deadline — the longest of any one-bite rule state on this site. Modified 51% bar means a plaintiff at exactly 50% fault still recovers half their damages, unlike neighboring one-bite states. |
New York dog bite questions, answered
The questions New York readers ask most often. General information, not legal advice.
What changed in New York dog bite law in 2025?
On April 17, 2025 the Court of Appeals decided Flanders v. Goodfellow, 2025 NY Slip Op 02261, overruling Bard v. Jahnke to the extent it barred negligence claims for injuries caused by domestic animals. For 19 years New York was the only state in the country where a dog bite victim could not sue in ordinary negligence. Victims can now pursue strict liability for vicious propensity, ordinary negligence, or both.
Does New York's dog bite statute cover pain and suffering?
No. Agriculture & Markets Law § 123 imposes strict liability for medical and veterinary costs only. Pain and suffering, lost wages and loss of consortium fall outside it and must be pursued either by proving the owner knew of the dog's vicious propensities or, since Flanders, through ordinary negligence.
What counts as a "vicious propensity" in New York?
Under Collier v. Zambito, 6 N.Y.3d 444 (2006), it is a tendency to act in a way that might endanger someone — and it need not be a prior bite. Courts have accepted evidence that a dog was routinely muzzled, chained, kept behind warning signs, or known to lunge and growl at passers-by.
How long do I have to file a dog bite claim in New York?
Three years from the date of the bite under C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is longer than most states. But if a city agency, housing authority or other municipality is involved, General Municipal Law § 50-e requires a notice of claim within 90 days and suit within one year and 90 days — a far shorter track that is easy to miss.
I was bitten before 2025 and told I had no case. Is that still true?
It may not be. Advice given under Bard v. Jahnke reflected a rule the Court of Appeals has since overruled, and New York's three-year deadline means a number of pre-Flanders claims remain within time. If you were turned away because you could not prove the dog had bitten before, that is worth a second look.
Can I recover if I was partly at fault in New York?
Yes. New York applies pure comparative negligence under C.P.L.R. § 1411, so your damages are reduced by your share of fault but never eliminated. A plaintiff found 80% responsible still recovers 20% — considerably more forgiving than Pennsylvania or Ohio next door, where a majority-at-fault plaintiff recovers nothing.
Can New York City ban a dog by breed?
No. Agriculture & Markets Law § 107(5) prohibits municipalities from enacting breed-specific legislation anywhere in the state. Breed is not part of the § 123 analysis either.
Key Takeaways for New York Dog Bite Victims
New York follows the Mixed Statute standard — that determines whether you need to prove the owner's prior knowledge or can hold them liable automatically. Understanding which standard applies is the first step in knowing whether you have a viable claim.
Your filing deadline is fixed by state law. Missing it permanently closes your case, no matter how strong the evidence is. Start the clock from the date of the bite.
Document everything from day one — photos of the injury, medical records, the dog owner's name, and any witness contact details. That documentation is the single most controllable factor in how much you ultimately recover.
Ready to understand what your case may be worth? See New York settlement amounts or connect with a New York dog bite lawyer for a free case review.
Sources & References
- 📄N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 123 — New York primary statute (Justia)
- 📊CDC Dog Bite Prevention — national injury statistics and prevention guidance
- ⚖️American Bar Association — Tort, Trial & Insurance Practice